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The core idea of this paper is that we can use the differences between democratic and 
undemocratic governments to illuminate ethical problems, particularly in the area of 
political philosophy. Democratic values, rights and institutions lie between the most 
abstract considerations of ethics and meta-ethics and the most particularised decisions, 
outcomes and contexts. Hence, this paper argues, we can use the differences between 
democratic and undemocratic governments, as we best understand them, to structure 
our theoretical investigations, to test and organise our intuitions and ideas, and to 
explain and justify our philosophical conclusions in ways analogous to the distinction 
between consequentialist and deontological theories in moral philosophy, or between 
liberal and republican principles in political philosophy.  In this way – or so I will argue – 
we can interpret and evaluate competing philosophical claims so that they are morally 
and politically attractive, as well as logically consistent.  Specifically, as we will see, a 
democracy-centred approach to ethics helps to distinguish liberal and democratic 
approaches to political morality in ways that reflect both the varieties of democratic 
theory, and the importance of distinguishing democratic from undemocratic forms of 
liberalism.  
 Most contemporary philosophers suppose that democracy is a presumptively 
legitimate form of government, in ways that alternatives are not and, at least tacitly, 
assume that it is a mark against a moral theory if it requires us to favour undemocratic, 
over democratic, forms of government.1 So, examining the assumptions about morality 
that are implicit in the description and justification of democratic government seems like 
a good way to illuminate and test abstract philosophical principles whether our interests 
lie primarily in the world of ‘ideal theory’, or in more familiar and realistic types of moral 
dilemma.2  
                                                          
1 The presumption of legitimacy seems to apply to those, like Richard Arneson (2004, 40-58) who suppose that 
democracy is justified only instrumentally, as well as to those, like Joshua Cohen, who think it has intrinsic value.  
2 For a guide to the debate around ‘ideal’ and ‘non-ideal’ theory see Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska, 2012. 
‘Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals’. Political Studies Review, 10, 48-62. 
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  I am a methodological pluralist, keen to let ‘a thousand flowers bloom’. So the 
point of this essay is primarily descriptive, aimed at describing a methodological 
approach that seems promising, relatively unexplored and untheorized, and that might 
prove an interesting point of comparison for those ploughing other methodological 
furrows. Nevertheless, because democratic theory illuminates the legitimate limits of 
government, and the scope for personal and political choice within those limits, the 
interest of this paper is prescriptive too. Our moral judgements and intuitions are 
unlikely to be consistent with democratic principles unless we deliberately seek to make 
them so. Hence, this paper suggest, democratic theory has an important place in 
philosophical ethics, whether our interests are in moral or political philosophy, or 
concerned with the problems of ideal, rather than non-ideal theory.   
 I will start by describing a democracy-centred approach to ethics in a bit more 
detail before examining its implications for the moral categories of right, duty and 
permission. As we will see, democratic government draws our attention to the ethical 
importance of the category of the permissible. Actions that are permissible, but not 
required, constitute a neglected category within much ethical theorizing, and within 
democratic theory itself. However, the structure, content and justification of different 
moral permissions illuminates the scope for competing, but democratic, theories of 
right, as well as the constraints on any democratic approach to morality. We can 
therefore use moral permissions, and their relationship to core rights and duties, to 
illuminate the differences amongst liberal and democratic theories of right without 
ignoring the undemocratic aspects of liberalism, or the ways in which democracies may 
be inspired by political ideals which are republican, conservative, socialist, or utilitarian, 
rather than liberal. The conclusion briefly notes the difficulties facing a democracy-
centred approach to ethics, and their implications for alternative methodological 




 For the sake of brevity, I will refer to the idea that democracies have a prima facie 
legitimacy that alternatives lack as ‘the democratic premise’, and will refer to ‘democratic 
ethics’ as a short-hand for ‘democracy-centred ethics’ – or an approach to ethics that 
starts from the democratic premise. I assume that legitimacy is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for justice in politics, although nothing in this paper turns on sharply 
distinguishing the two. However, it is important to note that the democratic premise is 
defeasible in two ways. First, we might agree with John Rawls, Joshua Cohen and David 
Miller who, for different reasons, believe that undemocratic governments can be 
legitimate, though not fully just (John Rawls, 2001; Joshua Cohen, 2009, 349-372; and 
David Miller, 2015, 177-192). Secondly, we may believe that democratic governments 
can lose their legitimacy altogether, whether through an accumulation of authoritarian, 
despotic, plutocratic or theocratic acts, or through such grave violations of human rights 
that citizens are released from their duty to obey. I therefore do not believe that ‘all 
good things go together’, nor do I assume that the democratic premise means that we 
must seek to maximise democratic government, whatever that might mean. On the 
contrary, I assume that the democratic premise is consistent with serious reservations 
about the value of democracy, and regret about the things it prevents us from doing or 
having – what I will call ‘the costs of democracy’. All else equal, we should try to lessen 
those costs and, I believe, try to ensure that they are fairly shared amongst citizens, 
whether those costs are political, moral, economic, aesthetic or scientific. Finally, nothing 
in this paper turns on having a precise idea of democracy. However, I assume that there 
can be a range of contrasting, but reasonable, forms of democracy philosophically, and 
in practice. It is important to democratic ethics, as I understand it, that its premises and 
conclusions be consistent with that variety.  
 
What is a Democracy-Centred Approach to Ethics? 
A democracy-centred approach to ethics takes the differences between democratic and 
undemocratic government to be central to the study of political philosophy and ethics, 
even though there is much that we do not yet know about democracy, and much about 
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its nature and value on which intelligent people disagree. Our sense of what is possible, 
desirable, necessary, and right are impregnated with unjustified assumptions about the 
proper attributes and relationships of men and women, as well as the significance of 
their racial or religious attributes. A conscious effort to ensure that our beliefs are 
consistent with democratic government, unfortunately, is no guarantee that they will be. 
However, it is safe to assume that such consistency will not happen by chance. Hence if, 
as it seems, most contemporary philosophers suppose that democratic government is 
justified, and has a presumptive legitimacy that alternatives lack, we should make that 
belief explicit and use it to guide our philosophical assumptions, bearing in mind that 
our beliefs about democracy are not self-evidently right, and that it sometimes takes a 
political movement to bring home to us the nature and significance of our philosophical 
mistakes.  
  A democratic approach to ethics, therefore, has two parts, which can be pursued 
separately, but must ultimately both be brought to bear on our judgements of political 
morality. The first part seeks to improve our understanding of the nature and value of 
democracy, understood as an ideal of self-government and as a lived reality, in light of 
the many different ways in which governments can be undemocratic. It takes its 
methodological inspiration from Judith Shklar’s insight, in The Faces of Injustice, that the 
study of different forms of injustice will improve our understanding of the nature and 
value of justice (Shklar, 1990, 15-51). Given the relatively few examples of democratic 
government with which we are familiar, compared to the many ways in which 
governments can be undemocratic, it seeks to use the latter to expand our sense of 
democratic possibilities, and their moral and political significance.  
 
For example, we might try to improve our understanding of the virtues and limits 
of democracy by asking ‘How Far Can You Go?’ before you have stretched democratic 
principles so far that they reach their outer bounds: ‘how far can you go’ in the directions 
of plutocracy, theocracy or anarchy without ceasing to be democratic (David Lodge, 
2011)? What special powers and privileges for the wealthy, whether intentional or not, 
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undermine the idea that you don’t need to be wealthy to be capable of, interested in, 
and deserving of public office and a share of political power (Phillips, 1999, 44-73)? 
Would a society where the arts were peopled overwhelmingly by the wealthy threaten 
democratic equality, liberty or solidarity – or only if, as in contemporary England, this 
were accompanied by dominance also of journalism and of the judiciary (Weale, 2013, 
65-94; 191-220)?3 Given that criticisms of plutocracy (or inequality more generally) are 
not inevitably democratic, trying to understand the point at which democratic principles 
and practices give way to plutocratic ones enables us to supplement conceptual analysis 
into equality and democracy with analysis of the dynamics and structure of ethically 
significant relationships. In clarifying the outer boundaries of democratic principles, we 
expose the scope for moral and political choice within those bounds and, therefore, for 
diversity amongst democracies (Stuart White 2014 and 2008). In short, the contrast 
between democratic and undemocratic governments gives us a more vivid appreciation 
of the variety and scope of democratic government, as well as of its virtues and 
limitations.  
 
 The second part of a democracy-centred ethics brings our best understanding of 
the nature and value of democracy to bear on the analysis of ethical problems, whether 
or not they are about democracy specifically. This part of the project starts from Joshua 
Cohen’s famous paper on the procedural and substantive dimensions of democracy 
(Cohen, 2009, 154-181). Cohen showed that we can use the values which distinguish 
democratic from undemocratic decisions to evaluate the moral dimensions of 
competing ideas about politics and morality, without having to speculate about the 
decisions that people would make in a hypothetical election.  Our ability to identify a 
decision process as democratic, and the ability to ascribe value to it, depend on our 
ability to agree on at least some matters of substance, despite our reasons to disagree 
with others on many other matters.  As Cohen summarises the argument in an earlier 





work, ‘…moral pluralism may reduce the range of possible agreement, and it will certainly 
exclude certain substantive ideas.  But it will not yield a fundamental cut between 
procedure and substance.  That simply is not a deep distinction’. (Cohen, 1994, 617).  
Thus, ‘the expressive interest which provides part of the case for an open democratic 
process also provides a rationale for substantive rights [eg. of religious freedom, 
freedom of non-political expression] that are not implicit in or required for democratic 
procedure …’ (Cohen, 1994, 614). Although Cohen himself has mainly applied his ideas 
in the context of the deliberative conception of democracy which he favours, we can use 
his insights to reflect on what policies and what theoretical claims are consistent with 
democratic government more broadly understood. At least in the first instance, the key 
question for a democracy-centred ethics is not ‘which form of democracy/government 
is best?’ but ‘what must be true for government to be democratic and, therefore, 
presumptively legitimate?’  Without a good sense of the differences between democratic 
and undemocratic government, it is difficult to resolve philosophical disagreements 
about people’s freedom in ways that are consistent with democratic forms of equality.  
 
To see the significance of this second part of a democratic ethics, consider the 
case of ‘outing’. ‘Outing’ involves the publicising, without consent, of sensitive personal 
information about someone else, in order to advance one’s favoured cause. The typical 
case involves revealing that some well-known or influential figure is gay or HIV positive 
– but the fact that someone has cancer, that they had an abortion, were a victim of rape, 
were once communists, or worked for the secret service are also examples of the 
phenomenon (Boling, 1996, 132-156). One reason why it is difficult to decide whether 
or not outing is consistent with people’s moral rights is that we find claims to freedom 
and equality on the side of those who want to publicise information that they believe to 
be important, and on the side of those who want to maintain their privacy and the ability 
to share sensitive information only with those they know and trust.  Appeals to the 
importance of liberty – even of equal rights to freedom of expression –are therefore 
insufficient to resolve what is, essentially, a conflict over claims to private, as opposed to 
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public, expression. Moreover, while Kantian and Utilitarian-inspired objections to outing 
are often persuasive, their bearing on democratic principles is uncertain. We would have 
duties not to treat people simply as means to our ends, or to be indifferent to their joys 
and suffering, whatever the form of government under which we lived, and whether or 
not we accepted the democratic premise.  So these objections to outing fail adequately 
to mark the morally significant differences between democratic and undemocratic forms 
of equality, liberty, right and duty, and risk confusing the claims to privacy of politicians 
and private citizens; of employers and employees and, even of men and women 
(Thompson, 1987; Mokrosinska, 2015, 181-201; Finkin, 1996 221-269; and 1997, 1-23; 
Boling, 1996, 132-156).4  
 
Put simply, it is not enough to ensure that our conclusions about outing are free 
from premises that are flatly at odds with democratic equality – premises about the 
special evils of female adultery, say, or about the special deviousness of gay men – if we 
want to resolve disputes about outing in ways that are consistent with the democratic 
premise.  In addition, we will want to ensure that our conclusions reflect the differences, 
however subtle, between those forms of respect and of happiness which are consistent 
with our equal claims to govern and those which are not.  It is important, then, to be 
able to isolate the forms of equality, liberty, solidarity and happiness implicit in 
democratic norms of government, if we care about sexual equality, and about the private 
as well as public dimensions of democratic freedoms.   
 
However, democracy is a contested concept. It is, therefore, necessary to start 
philosophical analysis with basic and relatively uncontroversial premises about 
democracy, even if these will need to be revised later. The second part of democracy-
centred ethics, then, involves a relatively simple, but potentially illuminating, approach 
                                                          
4 For those, like Nagel, who reject feminist claims that the personal is political, outing is presumptively wrong, whether we are 
considering the case of ordinary individuals, of the US President, or of a potential Supreme Court nominee. (Nagel 1998, 3-30; and 
also Nagel 2005. ‘The Central Question’. London Review of Books, 27.3. 12 -13. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v27/n03/thomas-nagel/the-
central-questions The difficulties with his view are well brought out by Susan Mendus 2008, 299-314. 
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to ethical disagreements, whether they are explicitly about democracy or not: Start from 
uncontroversial assumptions about democratic rights, duties, institutions and values, 
which can be treated as provisional fixed points for ethical reflection, and see what 
conclusions follow from them for philosophical controversies about people’s rights and 
duties, or the relative merits of competing ethical approaches and values. Proceeding 
this way means that we do not need to prejudge controversies about fact and value, 
such as whether egalitarians should be worried about the distribution and effects of 
brute luck; or whether democracy is consistent with judicial review (Lippert-Rasmussen, 
2016; Waldron 2006, 1346; Harel 2016, 191-224.). However if our conclusions are correct, 
they will provide answers to ethical questions that anyone can accept and use, provided 
that they accept the democratic premise.   
 
 For instance, what is striking about outing, from a democratic perspective, is the 
unaccountable, but potentially devastating, power over others which the practice 
involves.  Who decides to do the outing, who is chosen as victim, how the costs and 
benefits of outing are determined are all decided in ways that deny victims the ability to 
influence a matter that may have serious implications for their lives, liberty, social 
standing, their prospects of employment, their marriage and the custody of their 
children (Boling 1996, 132-156). Nor of course, is there any scope for appeal, oversight 
or compensation implicit in outing, as usually practiced. Such extensive and 
unaccountable power seems fundamentally undemocratic, even if outing may achieve 
ends which promote equality or democratic government. Reflection on the forms of 
equality and freedom implicit in democratic norms of government, then, may help us to 
formulate a philosophical approach to outing which acknowledges the political 
importance of freedom of expression, (Joshua Cohen, 2009; Barendt, 2007, 198-246;) but 
also the ways in which privacy can express and foster distinctively democratic ideas 
about the substance, as well as the form, of people’s claims to equality (Brettschneider, 
2007, 71-95; Jean Cohen 1992; Finkin, 1996 and 1997). On democratic principles, we 
would expect protection for the non-consensual disclosure of personal information to 
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be more extensive and more morally stringent in the case of private citizens than 
politicians, because the content and strength of their claims to privacy are necessarily 
constrained by their duties of public accountability (Thompson, 1987; Mokrosinska, 
2015; Lever, 2015 b). An adequate account of people’s rights, permissions and duties in 
the case of the non-consensual publication of personal information would have to deal 
with problems of joint privacy, of anonymous outing, of outing for pay and so on. 
However, for our purposes the important point is this: that the democratic premise helps 
to determine what forms of freedom of expression and of privacy people are entitled to, 
whatever our philosophical interests in ethics.  
 We have seen that the differences between democratic and undemocratic 
government suggest a distinctive approach to issues of morality. That approach has two 
parts, which are designed to improve our understanding of the nature, variety and value 
of democracy, and of its significance for philosophical disagreements about politics and 
morality. While this approach to morality is distinctive, its conclusions should be 
consistent with any other approach to ethics that adopts the democratic premise, at 
least implicitly. However, an explicitly democratic approach to ethics has methodological 
and substantive advantages over those that adopt the democratic premise only 
implicitly, given the increasing interest in the significance of democracy for 
epistemology, philosophy of science, as well as feminist philosophy and philosophy of 
race (Miranda Fricker, 2007; Philip Kitcher, 2011; Sally Haslanger, 2012). Above all, as we 
will see, a democracy-centered ethics offers a distinctive perspective on moral 
permissions, and their significance for the justification of liberal and democratic rights.  
 
Democratic Permissions, Rights and Duties 
Democratic politics implies that mutually inconsistent political platforms can be 
legitimate, and legally enforceable, depending solely on the outcome of elections. This 
is the case whether we look at elections from the perspective of ideal theory, or in more 
realistic ways. Our interests in self-government are not reducible to avoiding 
unconscionable demands, important though it is to the justification of democracy that 
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people have interests in fulfilling their moral duties as they see them. Hence those who 
believe that democratic principles justify a legal obligation to vote assume that there is 
a wide, potentially infinite range of political choices which individuals are morally free – 
and should be legally free – to make (Hill, 2010, 917-923; Lacroix, 2007, 190-195; Lijphart, 
1997, 1-14), including such political choices as whether to join a party or union, to 
protest, or to use one’s financial resources, time and experience on behalf of any 
particular political group.  
 
 Democracy, then, draws attention to the importance of permissions for political 
as well as personal morality, and suggests that we cannot equate the permissible with 
the morally insignificant, or see it simply as the residual category left over by studying 
what is morally required and forbidden.5 Treating permissions as morally insignificant 
fails to reflect the weight and variety of what, potentially, is the most common type of 
moral action.6 Moreover, treating permissions as residuals overlooks the way that the 
morally required or prohibited is sometimes best explained by the need to give people 
a real measure of power and responsibility, if they are to see and treat each other as 
equals. For example, if we think of marriage as something which we are neither morally 
required nor forbidden to do, (as is usually the case nowadays), we have an example of 
a permitted act whose importance explains and justifies prohibitions on certain types of 
interference (such as forcefully separating the bride and groom after the wedding), and 
certain requirements, (to provide appropriate help and protection against forceful 
separation, for example). Some of these prohibitions and requirements might be 
personal, reflecting our particular relationship to would-be brides and grooms; some 
might be impersonal, reflecting the place of marriage in a society governed by 
                                                          
5 The idea that the morally permissible is of no ethical significance figures in Waldron’s arguments for ‘A Right to 
Do Wrong’ (Waldron, 1993, 63-87). However, it is only one of several arguments.  So nothing I say about 
permissions is meant to foreclose the possibility that, as he claims, such a right exists.  
6 See also Bernard Williams’ critique of moralistic views of ethics in Bernard Williams, 1986, esp. 174-196.  Ethics 
and the Limits of Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Reflection on democratic permissions, then, may help to 
elaborate the normative implications of Williams’ critique.  
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democratic principles and the role of state agents in fostering and protecting those 
principles (Phillips, 2010, 124-141; Lever, 2011, 54-55, 62-63).7   
The morally permitted, then, may explain and justify the attribution of moral 
rights and duties, as well as moral judgments about what is prohibited or required. This 
would enable us to generalize Jeremy Waldron’s insights into the way that rights can 
generate ‘waves of duty’ because the importance of our interests in not being tortured 
can justify duties not to torture, duties to prevent others from torturing, duties to treat 
and sustain those who have been tortured, duties to publicise the evils of torture and so 
on (Waldron, 1993, 1-34). Analogously, the importance of our interests in marrying, 
whether or not we are morally required to do so – and in refraining from marrying, 
although it would not be morally wrong to marry – would seem to explain and justify 
moral rights to marry, and to refrain from marrying, as well as the ascription of individual 
and collective duties of non-interference, duties of aid and support and even, perhaps, 
duties to inform people that they have a right to marry and when and where they might 
wish to exercise it. In short, democratic principles and practice suggest the importance 
of a class of moral acts – permissions – which are often treated as morally insignificant, 
or as best thought of as the corollary of other moral categories.  
It is a staple of liberal thought that people can be morally permitted to pick up a 
coin found on the road, although others are not duty-bound to allow them to do so. 
Such permissions can be described as Hohfeldian liberties or privileges (although 
Hohfeld was mainly concerned with the structure of legal rights, rather than moral 
ones).8 They can be distinguished from those morally permissible acts which are so 
important that others have duties not to interfere with them; the latter can be described 
                                                          
7 I assume, with Waldron, that Raz is correct to describe rights as protecting particularly important human interests 
through the attribution of (negative) duties of non-interference and/or (positive) duties of aid.  I also follow 
Waldron in supposing that rights are not reducible to duties, even though they can be identified and described in 
terms of the duties to which they give rise. (Waldron 1993, 1-34). 
8 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 1913. ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, Yale Law 
Journal, 23. 16 available free online at  
http://www.hiit.fi/files/ns/Herkko/SOME%20FUNDAMENTAL%20LEGAL%20CONCEPTIONS%20AS%20AP
PLIED%20IN%20JUDICIAL%20REASONING.pdf  and Wenar, Leif, "Rights", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), section 2.1. 
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as Hohfeldian claim rights. For liberals, then, permissions can be distinguished into two 
groups. The same is true also for permissions on a democracy-centred approach to 
ethics, because some morally permitted acts are more important than others if we care 
about democratic government.  
The differences between liberal and democratic approaches to moral rights, then, 
can be illuminated by examining permissions and their role in justifying duties. We 
might, therefore, think of the difference between liberal and democratic approaches to 
rights as, in part, a matter of the different justifications that they give for treating one 
permission rather than another as duty-conferring. In so far as these different 
justifications result in overlapping reasons to believe that individuals have a particular 
moral right, we will have reasons to suppose that liberal rights are consistent with 
democracy, because consistent with democratic duties.  In so far as liberal and 
democratic approaches to permissions result in different rights, whose duties are 
capable of being jointly fulfilled, we would have reason to think that liberal and 
democratic rights, while different, are mutually consistent. However, it is also possible 
that liberal principles imply duties that cannot be fulfilled while respecting the 
importance of particular permissions to democratic government. In those cases, liberal 
rights would be incompatible with democratic ones, and it would then be important to 
try to establish why these permission-protecting duties are mutually incompatible, and 
how serious that incompatibility is for the possibilities of distinguishing democratic from 
undemocratic forms of liberalism.  
Let’s return to the example of marriage, whose importance for a democratic 
theory of rights reflects the significance of sexual and marital relations to freedom, 
equality, privacy, solidarity and security. Liberal rights to marry are generally justified by 
the importance of the permission to marry to individuals’ abilities to define themselves 
and their ends, to act on their moral and religious convictions and to pursue happiness 
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as they see it (Kaplan, 1997, 207-239).9 A democratic perspective on marriage, then, will 
be more or less liberal depending on the importance it attaches to individual self-
expression, to romantic and sexual satisfaction, and to religious views that define morally 
acceptable sex in terms of people’s marital status and relationship. But whether liberal 
or not, democratic approaches to marriage will be primarily concerned with the forms 
of power implicit in, and licensed by, the rules governing people’s sexual, amorous and 
familial relationships, as well as the consequences of leaving such matters without legal 
regulation or recognition at all (Elizabeth Brake, 2012; Clare Chambers 2013; Mary 
Lyndon Shanley, 2004).  
Who can marry whom, how many people can marry each other and how, 
precisely, marriage differs from other voluntary associations are moral questions, from a 
democratic perspective, because the rules governing our personal relationships affect 
our ability to see each other as equal citizens and co-rulers, rather than as traitors, 
criminals or delinquents (Lever, 2011, 62-68 and Brettschneider, 2007 pp71-84). 
Democratic perspectives on marriage will likely be more concerned with the status and 
opportunities of ascriptive groups than liberal ones, and more concerned with the 
distribution of power, than of happiness or self-expression – as is true of democratic 
principles more generally (Melissa S. Williams,1998, 57-69 and 75-82; Phillips 1998, 1-26 
and 2010, 124-142; Chambers 2013, and 2007, 81-116).10 Conservative political 
principles will likely favour familiar or conventional moral permissions over novel or 
unconventional ones, when deciding which permissions merit protection by moral 
duties, whereas democratic principles will generally favour permissions that help to 
break up sexual, racial and class hierarchies over those which promote harmony. In short, 
                                                          
9 This point was important to the Majority arguments for constitutional rights to abortion by married couples in 
Griswold of Connecticut 381 U.S., 479 (196) and, subsequently, to the recognition of Constitutional protections for 
consensual adult homosexual sex Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 2003) and marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 
U.S., 2015. 
10 I do not mean to imply that democratic theorists are inevitably more interested in power than liberal ones.  
However, any democratic approach to marriage – whether liberal, republican, socialist or anarchist – must be 
concerned with people’s equal claims to share in the rules that bind them, whatever else marriage might or 
might not involve. To that extent, democratic theorists have to be concerned with the distribution of power, 
whatever else they are concerned with, be that happiness, freedom, independence, or solidarity.  
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a democracy-centred approach to ethics enables us to use moral permissions as a way 
to think about the differences, as well as the commonalities, between liberal, 
conservative, egalitarian and utilitarian forms of democracy.   
If these arguments are persuasive, a democratic approach to ethics provides an 
important corrective to Thomas Christiano’s account of liberal rights in The Constitution 
of Equality (Christiano, 2008), as well as to Jeremy Waldron’s approach in his magisterial 
collection, Liberal Rights (Waldron, 1993). Waldron helpfully illuminates the justification 
for democratic political rights and welfare rights on an (egalitarian) liberal theory of 
rights, through an analysis of the relationship of rights and duties, and the defence of 
welfare rights, including the rights of the homeless, and of the stateless (Waldron, 1993, 
35-62, 225-308, 309-338). However, he never distinguishes liberal and democratic 
theories of rights, and this makes it difficult to distinguish democratic from undemocratic 
forms of liberalism, although at least some variants of liberalism justify undemocratic 
forms of government. (Mehta 1999, 3-4) Waldron appears to believe that liberalism, 
correctly understood, is necessarily egalitarian and democratic in its implications (Forst, 
2011, 157). But while this position is appealing in many ways, it is one thing to say that 
liberalism can be democratic, even radical in its consequences (Zillah Eisenstein, 1986) 
and another to suppose that this is the only correct way to interpret its moral or political 
premises.  
By contrast, the difficulty with Christiano’s ‘egalitarian’ justification of liberal rights 
is that it assumes that liberal and democratic rights are different in classically liberal 
ways.  Liberal rights, on this view, are rights that protect freedom of conscience, 
association and speech, and are justified by individuals’ interests in being treated 
publicly as equals (Christiano 2008, 130). Those same interests in public treatment as an 
equal also justify what, for Christiano, are a separate set of rights – democratic rights - 
although the content of these democratic rights is never specified, nor their difference 
from liberal rights made clear.  The reason to distinguish the two sets of rights, for 
Christiano, is that ‘liberal rights…serve as limits to the authority of democracy’ (130). The 
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intuition behind this picture of liberal and democratic rights is clear: if the justification 
for both liberal and democratic rights is the importance of (a particular understanding) 
equality, any conflicts between liberal and democratic rights can be adjudicated in ways 
that reflect their shared foundations in people’s claims to equality. We can therefore be 
certain that liberal rights will be compatible with people’s claims to equality even when 
they limit what people can do democratically.  
 However, this picture of the relationship of liberalism and democracy begs the 
question of why we should treat freedoms of conscience, association and speech as 
liberal rather than democratic, and why we should suppose that public recognition as an 
equal is more important than private. A-priori, we have no reason to assume that the 
limits of democracy are reducible to problems for which liberal rights are the solution, 
or that the limits of democracy are set by liberal political principles, rather than 
conservative, utilitarian or anarchist ones. So while Christiano is correct that rights 
limiting democratic choice will be consistent with democratic government if they have a 
common foundation, there is no reason to give those limits a liberal interpretation.11 
We cannot distinguish liberal and democratic rights by thinking of them as two 
sets of rights sharing a common conception of equality precisely because that is to 
assume what needs to be shown – that liberal and democratic rights have a common 
foundation, and that this foundation rests on a philosophical commitment to equality, 
(rather than, say, on shared premises about liberty, or shared conventions for debate 
and decision-making). Instead, I have suggested, we do best to think of liberalism and 
democracy as offering different justifications for rights, at least some of which can be 
conceptualised as morally important permissions, whose protection explains why people 
have moral duties they would otherwise lack.12 While liberal and democratic accounts of 
rights, on this view, are likely to overlap in important ways, there is no reason to suppose 
                                                          
11 This is, in part, a problem with Brettschneider’s account of democratic rights, which is based on an idealised 
version of the American constitution, and on liberal egalitarian assumptions about democracy (Brettschneider, 2007 
and 2012; Lever, 2015d, 164-183; and 2015c. 14-24.] 
12 As Waldron implies, some types of rights are rights to a specific benefit, or to be shielded from a specific evil, 
like torture, rather than to make certain types of morally significant decisions. Waldron, 1993, 79. 
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that liberal rights are always democratic, or to foreclose the possibility that some forms 
of democracy are quite illiberal.  What the latter might look like, and how illiberal a 
democratic conception of rights can be are substantive questions to which we urgently 
need answers.13 The implication of recent work on democracy and rights is that political 
equality requires the protection of personal freedom (Thomas, forthcoming Dec. 2016; 
Pettit, 2012; Bellamy, 2007; Brettschneider, 2007;Cohen, 2009; Phillips, 2010, 107-123). 
But how much liberty, and of what kind, needs to be rendered more precise, because we 
can suppose that people have fundamental interests in sexual, religious and economic 
freedom without supposing that the content and justification for protecting them must 
be liberal if democratic. 
A democracy-centred ethics, then, enables us to build on the insights of Waldron 
and Christiano into the nature and justification of basic rights without supposing that 
we have a very clear idea of the conceptual, moral and political differences between 
liberal and democratic government.  This is desirable because the philosophy of rights 
is going through a remarkable period of change, with important and unresolved disputes 
about the best way to think of human rights, and the differences between justice and 
charity (Cruft et al 2015; Estlund, 2011 and 2014). Even conceptual debates about rights 
are being unsettled by the reasons to suppose that the purpose of some rights is to 
delineate a socially important status, occupation or relationship, rather than to protect 
an especially important human interest or choice (Wenar, 2005, 2013, 2015). It is quite 
likely that our ideas about liberal and about democratic rights will be altered by these 
debates, in ways that need to be assimilated.  It is also likely that we will need to rethink 
our ideas about liberalism in light of recent debates on democratic constitutionalism, 
and recent work on republican ideas of democracy (Bellamy, 2007; Pettit, 2012). Hence, 
there is much that we still need to learn about liberal and democratic approaches to 
rights, as well as about the varieties of democracy.  
                                                          
13 See, for example,  G.A.Cohen’s objections to Rawls’ Difference Principle, on the grounds that equality demands 
a much smaller scope for a ‘self-regarding prerogative’, or ‘personal prerogative’ than Rawls and Rawlsians 






We have seen that a democracy-centred ethics casts a new light on methodological and 
substantive issues in normative political theory and moral philosophy. It draws attention 
to the moral and political importance of permissions for our judgements of right and 
duty, and to the ways we might think about the differences between democratic and 
undemocratic forms of government. However, a democracy-centred ethics makes plain 
that there is much we do not know about basic moral concepts, and that the way we 
describe and categorise them is likely to be affected by beliefs and practices which 
predate democratic government.    
Placing the differences between democratic and undemocratic government at the 
heart of our ideas of ethics, therefore, is a risky business, exposing our ignorance about 
morality.  There is a lot we do not know about democratic government, given the limited 
models with which we are familiar. Our experiences of democracy, moreover, are 
unavoidably tainted by structural injustice, as well as by less deep-rooted, but still 
troubling, forms of hostility, indifference, and contempt for others. Putting the 
differences between democratic and undemocratic government at the centre of our 
approach to ethics risks placing mistaken views of fact and value at the heart of our 
beliefs about morality. However, those risks do not vanish because we ignore them, or 
assume that the differences between democratic and undemocratic government are 
irrelevant to the problems we study. So if we want our claims about morality to be 
consistent with democratic principles, we have good reason to place the differences 
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